Florida Law Review
Volume 22

Issue 4

Article 7

May 1970

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device,
and Its Utilization
Ronald E. Young

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald E. Young, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device, and Its Utilization, 22
Fla. L. Rev. 631 (1970).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss4/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Young: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Devic
1970]

CLASS ACTIONS

The small-sized P.A. is practically forced to elect under Subchapter S to
avoid the personal holding company tax. Therefore, only the larger P.A.'s
have an option in the matter. For them, the probable deciding factors are
the extent to which the -shareholders want to be fully taxed on their shares
of the corporate income and the extent of contributions to be made to a
qualified pension or profit-sharing plan. If their tax brackets are so high
that, even under the single tax, it would cost more to take the mandatory
distributions from the P.A. than to be subject to the "double tax" on a P.A.
operating under Subchapter C, it would be better not to make the election.
MICHAEL L. FoRAtAN
JAMEs B. BOGNER

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULE 23, THE CLASS
ACTION DEVICE AND ITS UTILIZATION
DEVELOPMENT

OF

RuLE 23

In principle, the law has accommodated representive suits for over 250
years.1 The evolution of class suits began when English equity courts found
it necessary to force joinder of all interested persons 2 in order to do complete
justice. The modem class action developed as both an escape from and an
adjustment to this compulsory rule of joinder. 3 The utility of the class action
concept, combined with the frequent impracticability of other procedures
has spurred its development. 4 The increasing number of situations in which
class actions are appropriate and the large number of plaintiffs represented
in such actions have challenged the law to provide an effective class action
rule.
1. See Z. CHAFaE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200-01 (1950).
2. Knight v. Knight, 3 P. Wins. 331 (1734).
3. Montgomery Ward g, Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
4. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). In addition to Federal Rule 23, class suits
are commonly allowed by state procedure. See, e.g., FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.220: When the question
is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the whole.
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The earliest attempt at such a rule, Equity Rule 38,5 promulgated in 1912,
simply provided that "when the question is one of common or general interest
to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole." However, this rule was generally limited to equitable actions 6 and
to situations where compulsory joinder was appropriate. 7 In 1938 the federal
courts adopted original rule 23, which attempted to restate in light of
modern developments the existing practice under Equity Rule 38. 8 Because
rule 2 of the 1938 Federal Rules declared there would be only one form of
action in federal courts, rule 23 applied the equitable doctrine of joinder to
all civil actions whether formerly denominated legal or equitable. 9
Original rule 23 established three types of class actions based on "jural
relations," or the kinds of rights belonging to the members of the class.' 0
The actions were classified either as "true," in which, but for the class
action device, joinder of all interested persons would be essential;" "spurious," in which the class was formed solely because of a common question
of law or fact; 12 or "hybrid," in which the class has a mutuality of interests,
3
but the rights of the members were several rather than joint or common.
From the outset, three basic problems hampered the effectiveness of
original rule 23. The "true," "spurious," and "hybrid" categories were vague,
and no consistent classification could be made by the courts.'

4

Moreover, the

rule did not indicate which persons would be bound by judgments in actions
under the rule. 15 The courts held that the type of class suit determined
who was bound by the judgment, thus placing great importance upon the
label given to the particular class suit in question. Considering the difficulty
of differentiating the rights involved, this dependence upon labeling further
impeded the rule's effective application.16 Finally, the general terms of the

5. Equity R. 38, 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1123.02[l], at 23-74 (2d ed. 1969).
6. See McNary v. Guaranty Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ohio 1934). But see Penny v.
Central Coal & Coke Co., 138 F. 769 (8th Cir. 1905).
7. See Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878 (1932).

8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C. App. (1964).
9. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f[23.02[1], at 23-75 (2d ed. 1969).
10. Comment, Adequate Representation. Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889 (1968).
11. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 148 F.2d 403, 405
(4th Cir. 1945).
12. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
13. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1123.09, at 23-2571 (2d ed. 1969).
14. Pennsylvania Co. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), illustrates this inconsistency.
On appeal, the court labeled it a "spurious" class suit. On remand, the district court termed
it "hybrid." 39 F. Supp. 592, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1941). On a second visit to the court of appeals,
it was decided that the label was unimportant. 123 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941).
15. The drafters felt this would violate the Federal Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §2072
(1964), which provides that the rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right.
16. Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules, 50 IowA L.
REV. 1135, 1153 (1965).
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rule did not provide adequate guidelines to insure that due process would
be afforded to absent members of the class.' 7
In 1966 rule 23 was completely revised to answer the current needs of a
"complex modern economic system where a single harmful act may result
in damages to a great number of people."' 8 New rule 23 does not alter the
underlying purpose of the former rule, but rather expands and clarifies it
and provides means better suited to accomplish its original purposes. The
amended rule abolishes the "jural relations" approach, thus eliminating the
need for the labels "true," "spurious," or "hybrid," and "describes in more
practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions."' 19 It provides that
the result of an action, whether favorable or not, is binding on all class
members unless they have chosen to be excluded.2 0 However, the amended
rule also permits the court to take certain steps to insure fairness to all
2
members of the class. 1
PREREQUISITES TO A CLAss ACTION UNDER NE w

RULE 23

Section (a) of the new rule sets forth four specific prerequisites to a
22
class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
Each of these prerequisites involves the basic problem of defining the class.
There can be no class action unless there is a class whose bounds can be
precisely drawn. 23 Because the judgment binds all nonexcluded class members, whether represented or not, courts will carefully apply this element
of the rule. 24 Although the exact number or identity of the class need not
2
be established,2 -5 the class must be defined with some precision. 6
The first prerequisite of rule 23 requires that joinder under rules 19
and 20 be "impracticable." The purpose of rule 19 is to allow everyone
See Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule
L. REv. 1150 (1968).
18. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
17.

23, 36 GEo. WASH.

U.S. 816 (1966).
19. See Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 99 (1966).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (3).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (d).
22. Fm). R. Civ. P. 23 (a).
23. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
24. Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's Point of View, 32 AN'rrmusr LJ. 295

(1966).
25. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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his day in court. Rule 19, however, does not aid litigants whose numbers
are so large that joinder is impracticable. The very heading of subsection
(a) of the rule is "Persons To Be Joined if Feasible," (emphasis added) and,
recognizing that it is not a proper substitute for a class action, rule 19
expressly states that its provisions are subject to the provisions of rule 23.
Rule 20 allows permissive joinder and permits an unlimited number of
parties to join in an action involving a common question of law or fact
arising out of the same transaction. 27 Although its purpose is to avoid multiple
trials involving the same facts, rule 20 expressly provides that any party may
be severed from the action and pursue his own course at any stage of the proceedings. 2 Thus, rules 19 and 20 contemplate an independent plaintiff (or
defendant) able to effectively prosecute an independent action. These rules
presuppose individual financial ability to prosecute claims and thus eliminate small claimants who, by jurisdictional facts, are precluded from joining
an existing action or whose large numbers make joinder impractical.
The number of persons involved in the suit is a primary consideration
in determining whether a proposed class suit satisfies the first rule 23 prerequisite that size of the class makes joinder of all members impracticable.
The developing case law indicates that courts will not view the number of
parties as determinative, but will consider the number in light of all pertinent
facts.2 9 This seems a reasonable approach since reliance on numbers alone

would defeat the basic purpose of the class suit concept and would place the
representative party and his lawyer in an undesirable position. Faced with
an arbitrary number as a basis for a class suit, attorneys would need either
to solicit members of the class or to advise their clients to solicit additional
members in cases where there were too few known members to support a
class action. In either case, the attorney is in danger of violating Canon 28
of the Canons of Ethics. ° However, even though courts will examine all
pertinent facts, the burden of showing that the size of the class is sufficient
rests upon the proponent of the class. 31
The second prerequisite of rule 23 (a) is that the case involve questions
of law or fact common to all members of the class. The advantages of a
class action would soon be defeated if each member attempted to base his
recovery on different law or facts. Interpretive problems concerning this
2
requirement have arisen particularly in the securities and antitrust areas.:
Generally, the defendant's conduct provides the common issues. Difficulties
arise when that conduct differs as to each prospective class member. In the
securities cases, for example, misrepresentations concerning the value of
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (a).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (b).
29. DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. &
Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
30.

ABA CANONS OF PROFFSSIONAL ETHics (as amended in 1968).

31. DeMarco v. Evans, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45
F.R.D. 258 (D. Del. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 275 F. Supp.
146 (E.D. Pa. 1968).

32. Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542 .(SD.N.Y. 1966).
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stock either might not be made to the public generally or might be contained
in more than one written statement. Questions of law or fact could vary
according to the particular circumstances surrounding each communication.
However, if such conduct is shown to be interrelated, injured parties can
maintain a class suit in accordance with the "common course of conduct"
concept.33 Every action will involve some individual elements in addition to
the common questions. Matters such as damages, degree of reliance, or statutes
of limitations, are individual in nature. Once some "common course of conduct" has been determined, no single individual element standing alone
should defeat the class suit. However, the cumulative effect of two or more
individual elements may render the suit unmanageable and thus make a
class action less desirable than some other procedural device.
Prerequisites three and four must be considered together since both are
designed to protect the absent class members who will be bound by the judgment. The third prerequisite requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Since
this requirement is new with the amended rule, it has received little judicial
interpretation. The provision attempts to insure that the representative will
act in the best interests of the absent class members.34 Its full meaning is
revealed when it is read in conjunction with the fourth prerequisite, which
requires that the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. Both requirements are subjective and together they
impose dual requirements on the prospective class representative. Subsection
(a) (3) emphasizes the necessity that the representative have common and
consistent interests with the class, while subsection (a) (4) considers the
ability of the representative to protect the interests of other class members.
When absent class members may find themselves bound by a judgment
resulting from an action of which they were unaware, lack of adequate
representation becomes a highly significant matter. Thus, "the interests of
the affected persons must be carefully scrutinized to assure due process
of law for the absent members." 35 Generally, adequate representation is
provided if the representatives' attorney is qualified and able to conduct the
proposed suit.38 The burden of showing inadequacy of counsel is on the
party claiming it and "until the contrary is demonstrated, courts will assume
that members of the bar are skilled in their profession." 37
The court must next determine the adequacy of the representative himself. Here again mere numbers are not controlling. 3 Nor is it determinative
that the interest of the representative is minute in relation to that of the
33. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa.
1968); Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
34. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 Htav. L. REv. 356 (1967).
35. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), citing Carroll v. American
Fed'n of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 1967).
36. Elsen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
37. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
38. Id.
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entire class. 39 In determining the adequacy of the representative, the court
40
has broad discretion dependent upon the circumstances of each case.
TYPES OF ACTIONS UNDER THE

NEW

RULE

By creating categories based on the effect that the action will have on

interested parties, new rule 23 attempts to avoid the problem of labeling
class suits in terms of "jural relations." Even if all prerequisites of section
(a) are met, the class action must also satisfy the requirements of section (b) .41
The (b) (1) category permits class actions where allowance of separate
actions would create a risk of certain undesirable effects, either for the class
or the opposing party. Under clause (A) of subsection (b) (1), a class action
is proper where there is a risk of inconsistent adjudications in separate suits
involving individual members of the class.42 However, the rule is not concerned with all possible inconsistent adjudications, but only those that
would create "incompatible standards of conduct" for the opposing party.
Thus, actions for money damages would not be affected by clause (A)
even where the opposing party might have to pay some class members but
4
not others. 3

Clause (B) of subsection (b) (1) concerns the effect of separate actions
on the members of the class. It allows a class action where separate adjudica39. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. Id.
41. Rule 23 (b) provides:
" (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
" (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
"(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
"(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
"(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action."
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (b) (1) (A).
43. A municipal bond issue serves as an example of incompatible conduct within
clause (A). Separate actions could be brought concerning the bond issue. One taxpayer
might seek to limit the issue while another could sue to have the issue declared invalid.
If these actions were tried separately, the municipality could be forced into incompatible
courses of conduct. Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 39
F.R.D. 69, 100 (1966).
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tions would either be dispositive of the interests of other class members or
substantially impair their ability to protect their interests. 4 4 The thrust of
clause (B) is the protection of class members' rights by insured representation through a class action. As yet, few cases have interpreted this provision,
apparently because it describes a natural test for class actions that courts
can easily apply according to the relief sought.
A subsection (b) (2) class action is proper when "the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole... ."Is The wording "generally
applicable" indicates that the opposing party need not act directly against
each member of the class. If his actions would affect all persons similarly
situated, the actions are generally applicable to the whole class. However, a
(b) (2) class action does not include all actions seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief, but only those in which "final" injunctive or declaratory
relief is appropriate.4 8 The (b) (2) category was intended to permit class
actions in the civil rights area;47 however, its application need not be
limited to such cases since the language is sufficiently broad to enjoin other
practices such as price fixing or the use of "tying" arrangements in antitrust
4 s
suits.
The concept of subsection (b) (3)differs slightly from that of the first
two subsections. Under (b) (3) the court must specifically find that common
questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and that a
class action is superior to any other form of settlement. 9 This category
purports to allow a class action when it would "achieve economies of time,
5
effort, and expense and promote uniformity of decision." 90
The actual motive
underlying this category, however, seems to be a sympathy for small claimants
who cannot afford individual litigation, but who may be unable to proceed
under (b) (1) and are not seeking the type relief required for a (b) (2)
action. The (b) (3) requirement that common questions predominate is
essentially a reiteration of prerequisite 23 (a), that there be questions of
law or fact common to the class. Thus, if the suit meets the prerequisite of
23 (a), the only additional requirement imposed by subsection (b) (3) is that
a class action be the best method of settling the controversy. From this
standpoint, the provisions of (b) (3) create a broad category particularly
favorable to the small claimant.

44. A clause (B) situation would arise where numerous persons have a claim against
a fund that is insufficient to satisfy all the claims. If separate actions were allowed, the
fund could be exhausted before all members were able to protect their interest. Id. at 101.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2) (emphasis added).
46. Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102
(1966).
47.
48.

Id.
Id.

49. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3).
50. Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69,
102-03 (1966).
-_
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MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

Notice
The greatest obstacle in utilizing rule 23 to aid the small claimant is the
notice requirement. Subsection (c) (2) requires "the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members [of a
(b) (3) class] who can be identified through reasonable efforts." Although
there are three categories under which actions may be brought, notice of the
pending action is specifically required only in (b) (3) actions.51 This requirement, coupled with the fact that class representatives may have to bear the
cost of such notice, greatly restricts the use of the (b) (3) class action by small
claimants.
52
The considerable discretion that the new rule vests in the trial judge
is particularly important when considering the notice requirement. Essentially, the rule permits the trial judge to determine the type of notice
necessary,5 3 limited only by the minimum due process standards established
by the courts. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin54 held that "notice is required
as a matter of due process in all representative actions, and . . . [the rule]

merely requires a particularized form of notice in 23 (b) (3) actions.."' 5

In

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,56 the Supreme Court stated

that reasonable notice is essential to acquire jurisdiction in all types of
actions. The class in Mullane consisted of beneficiaries of a common trust
fund, and the questions of law and fact in regard to each member were
identical. If notice is required in an action where the legal and factual
situations of the class members are identical, then clearly, due process
requires notice where the parties are less representative and common legal and
factual questions merely predominate over individual questions. However,
not all commentators agree; and it has been argued that the class action is
an exception to the constitutional rule that litigants must be afforded notice
and an opportunity to be heardY5 In light of Eisen and Mullane, due process

51. Notice requirements in a (b) (1) or (b) (2) class action are within the discretion of
the trial judge. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
52. See Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 577 (1969).
53. Two basic questions presented are: (I) What is the best possible notice? and (2)
When is individual notice required?
54. 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968). This was an action by an odd-lot investor on
behalf of himself and all other buyers and sellers of odd-lots on the New York Stock
Exchange during the years 1960-1966.
55. Id. at 564. The reason given by the Advisory Committee for the mandatory notice
requirement in a (b) (3) action is to provide all prospective class members an opportunity
to be excluded from the class. Since (b) (3)actions are often amenable to separate litigations,
the rule provides an escape clause whereby members may "opt out" of the class suit. 39
F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
56. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
57. Pomerantz, The "Notice to the Class" Under the Amended Rule 23, 1968 Practicing
L. Inst. 33; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), is cited for this conclusion. It is generally
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apparently requires some notice in all class actions, and "the best possible"
notice when questions of law or fact differ among class members. Thus,
even if common questions predominate in a (b) (3) action, individual notice
may still be required where questions of law or fact differ.
Solicitation Problems in Giving Notice
Notice must be given in a circumspect manner or the representative's
attorney may violate Canons 42 and 28 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 58
When the class representative is unable to afford the cost of notice, attorneys
anticipating large fees may be tempted to absorb this cost themselves. This
action would violate Canon 42, which prohibits attorneys from paying the
cost of litigation. In most cases this difficulty could be avoided by allowing
the attorney, as provided in Canon 42, to advance expenses subject to reimbursement by the client.
Canon 28 provides that "stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but also indictable at common law." 59 It is difficult to
reconcile the notice requirement, which will generate litigation and fees,
with Canon 28. The answer apparently lies in the method and form of
the notice itself. The method used and the wording of the notice should
ensure "accuracy and impartiality in the substance of statements sent to
class members, as well as a general tone which will not lend itself to
unseemly solicitation of clients or imply official approval of claims as yet
untried." 60 In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co.,61
the court held that notice should be "neutral and objective in tone, and
62
should neither promote nor discourage the assertation of claims."
The court must consider the interests of both the class and its opponent
with regard to the preparation and sending of the notice. The ethical risk
of client solicitation would seem to exist only until the court decides that
the action is maintainable as a class suit; once this is established notice to
the class would seem to be consistent with the intent of the rule to allow
individual small claimants a method of recovery. Insofar as notice may
encourage the aggregation of small claims, that purpose is satisfied.
In order to protect himself, the attorney should request court guidance
regarding the steps that can be taken to determine the total class membership, thereby insulating himself against possible claims of solicitation.3 In

agreed, however, that Hansberry allows an exception only for the personal service of process
and does not eliminate the requirement of reasonable notice.
58. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ErHics (as amended in 1968).
59. Id.
60. Kaplan, supra note 34, at 398.
61. 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
62. Id. at 156.
63. This was the position stated by the Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievance of the
Bar Association of the District of Columbia in answer to an inquiry submitted by one of
its members. See Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure,
49 B.U.L. Rxv. 407 (1969).
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Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. 64 lawyers were offered
another method of protection. The court directed the plaintiff's attorney to
submit the notice form to the court for approval, thus preventing later claims
that the notice forms were used for client solicitation. For the same reason,
the court in School District v. Harper & Row Publishers6- held that the
notice form must be prepared by the court. However, this holding has been
greatly criticized, 66 and courts now generally agree that the notice should be
prepared by the plaintiff rather than by the court itself. 6 7

Neither the rule nor the advisory note indicate who should bear the
expense of the notice. The general rule is that, initially, the plaintiff must
pay for the notice;66 however, in cases where the representative party has
limited financial means, following this rule is likely to result in dismissal
of the action.69 This result undermines the rationale for allowing class
actions in the first instance - the "historic mission of taking care of the
smaller guy." 70 It has been suggested that the expense of notice should be
borne initially by the court- 1 however, this method might involve a misappropriation of public funds,7 2 and thus is not likely to be generally adopted.
While not deciding who should pay for the notice, the court in Dolgow v.
Anderson 73 suggested that the court's postal mailing privilege might be used
to defray the expense. Dolgow also presented three arguments in favor of
compelling a corporate opponent of the class to bear the expense of notice.74
Despite the various approaches suggested, at present the plaintiff must bear
the cost of preparing and mailing the notice. Since it is the plaintiff who
benefits from the notice, the present rule seems proper. Any other method
would be fundamentally unfair. The emotional reaction against denying

64. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
65. 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
66. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Kaplan, supra note
34, at 398 n.157.
67. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle 8 Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
68. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Richland v. Cheatham,
272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Annual Judicial Conference-Third Judicial Circuit of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 437 (1966). But see Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The problem posed by Canon 42, previously
discussed, is equally applicable to the area of notice payment.
69. If the class suit failed, the practical impossibility of collecting the cost of notice
from other class members would mean that the representative would have to bear the cost
of notice.
70. Frankel, supra note 24, at 299.
71. Comment, Recovery of Damages in Class Actions, 32 U. Cm. L. REy. 768, 781 n.69
(1965).
72. In such a situation, public funds would in effect be utilized for the benefit of
private parties, this violates the general rule that public funds must be utilized only for
public purposes.
73. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
74. The court gave as reasons: "the fiduciary obligations of the corporation, the advantages to the corporation of a judgment with res judicata effects against a class, and the
ability to bear the cost." Id. at 478.
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the small claimant access to the courts must be balanced against the interests
of the absent class members who must be protected. In Eisen, the dissenting
judge pragmatically considered the management problems of notice where
there were 3.75 million class members, the claim of the representative party
was only 70,000 dollars, and the estimated cost of notice was 400,000 dollars.
The dissent argued that the claim was totally unmanageable as a class suit
and stated: "[C]lass actions were not meant to cover situations where almost
everybody is a potential member of the class."' 5 The future may vindicate
the wisdom of that argument.
Damages
Although the difficult problem of determining and distributing damages
will not arise until the end of the class action, it bears significantly upon
the initial maintainability of the suit as a class action. Early in the litigation,
when the court must determine whether the suit may proceed as a class
action 76 one of the principal considerations is the factor of economy. In
order to achieve economy, the questions common to the class must predominate over questions affecting individual members. Where individual questions such as damages predominate over the common questions, the class
action will not be allowed.
In a class action the court has broad powers to determine and regulate
the allocation of damage. 7 7 The methods used will, of course, vary according
to the type of action involved. In the frequently occurring class action
involving antitrust violations the problems of allocation are simplified by the
presence of a certain commodity. After the court first determines the fair
market value of the commodity, each class member proves the amount of
the commodity he purchased. Using this procedure, the court can determine
the liability of the defendant and, if possible, any common issues of damages.
The damages of absent class members can be determined at later pro8
ceedings.7
Instances where large numbers of investors were induced by fraud or
misrepresentation to trade in securities are increasingly litigated as class
actions.70 In these cases equitable relief such as an injunction or declaratory
relief is widely granted, but plaintiff class members have frequently also
been awarded money damages.8 0 As in antitrust cases, the allocation of damages is based on the fair market value of the commodity; however, the
determination here is more complex because of fluctuations in value and
the fact that the misrepresentation itself often obscures the fair market
value. Once this factor is determined, damages are allocated simply by
75. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).

76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1).
77. FED. R. Cw. P. 23 (d).

36

78. Cf. State Wholesale Grocers v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958).
79. Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23,
GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 1150 (1968).
80. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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multiplying the number of shares purchased by the damage per share.
Regardless of the type of class action, the class representative usually must
propose the procedure for allocation of damages.8 1
In a successful class action, the court faces the additional problem of
distributing the damages to each individual class member. Depending upon
the circumstances of each case, various procedures have been utilized, with
special emphasis given to considerations of time and cost. 82 One common
method, appointing a master to supervise distribution of damages, is particularly effective in cases requiring complex accounting, such as antitrust
suits, shareholders' suits, and securities cases. In such cases the master may
examine the defendant's records to ascertain each class member's damage, 3
and ensure that each receives his appropriate share. Perhaps the most efficient
method of distribution requires the defendant, under the direction of a
master, to reimburse the plaintiffs directly.8 4 Regardless of the distribution

method used, the court will normally set a specific time within which members of the class must file their individual claims. 85 At the end of this period,
a final decree will be entered and no further recoveries will be permitted.
UTILIZATION OF

NEW RULE 23

The nature and scope of private litigation has been drastically altered by
the adoption of new rule 23. As these changes are most noticeable in securities and antitrust actions the rule's application in these areas will be discussed
in some detail. Recent cases8 6 indicate, however, that the rule's usefulness is
by no means limited to these areas.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Snyder v. Harris,s ' however, seems

to undermine the basic purpose of the rule and may have a pronounced
effect on the effective utilization of the new rule. The Court held that
separate and distinct claims presented by and for various claimants in a
class action under rule 23 may not be aggregated to satisfy the 10,000 dollar
jurisdictional amount in diversity suits. In Snyder the court adhered to the
traditional judicial interpretation of the phrase "matter in controversy" - the
judge-made doctrine that labeled class actions under the old rule as true,
hybrid, or spurious and fitted it inflexibly into the new rule 23 procedure.
The intent of the new rule was to emphasize practicability and eliminate
81.

Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732; 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967);

Realty Equities Corp. v. Gerosa, 209 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
82. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939), where the cost
of distributing damages was $2,700,000.
83. Heine v. Degan, 362 Ill. 357, 199 N.E. 832 (1936).
84. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939).
85. Id. at 65.

86. Gomez v. Layton, 394 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (use of class action by alleged
vagrants against the Police Dep't of Washington, D.C.); Adderly v. Wainwright, 272 F. Supp.
530 (M.D. Fla. 1968) (class action used by prison inmates in habeas corpus proceeding).
For a discussion of the rule's use in civil rights cases, see Comment, The Class Action Device
in Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 577 (1953).
87. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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the tenuous distinctions among true, hybrid, and spurious actions. The Court
conceded the functional purpose behind the rule, but reached a most unfortunate decision that seems to breathe new life into the old class action
distinctions.""
Securities Fraud Actions
The effectiveness of civil remedies for defrauded securities investors is
largely dependent upon the availability of the class action device. 89 Without
this procedure few plaintiffs would be willing to institute such lengthy, complicated, and costly proceedings. 90 The new rule allows class suits by defrauded securities investors under section (b) (3),91 under the justification
that questions common to the class predominate over those affecting only
individual members. 92 In such suits, the common questions deal with the
conduct of the defendant and with the nature of the fraudulent statement
or statements made to the class.
No difficulty exists when only one fraudulent statement is alleged 93 or
when statements entirely dissimilar in content are made individually to
the class members. 94 However, most cases fall somewhere between these two
extremes. Here the basic determination is whether "the complaint alleges
a common course of conduct over the entire period, directed against all
investors, generally relied upon, and violating common statutory provisions
... ,,5 Although clearly a class action will not be permitted where the
misrepresentations are varied and dissimilar,9 6 courts may allow class suits
where there is a series of somewhat related misrepresentations. In Fischer v.
Kletz,97 a class suit was allowed even though the misrepresentations were
contained in seven different financial statements. Admitting that the misrepresentations were different, the court nonetheless allowed class treatment
due to the "interrelated and cumulative" effect of the statements. This

88. See Comment, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & CoumM. L. REv. 601, 604 n.17 (1969). But see Comment,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims To Meet the Jurisdictional Amount, 22 U. FLA. L. R.v. 154 (1969).

89. 3 L. Loss, SECURrrims RE.GuLATION 1819 (1969).
90. Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co., 43 F.R.D. 169, 173 (D.S.D. 1967).
91. See Burger v. Purolater Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Prior to
considering § (b) (3) requirements all § (a) prerequisites must be met. See text accompanying
notes 22-40 supra. For a recent case discussing these prerequisites in the securities fraud
area, see Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
92. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure No. 23, 39 F.R.D.

98, 103 (1966).
93. This is generally the case in a suit by purchasers of a newly issued security, based
upon fraudulent allegations in the prospectus.
94. See Hirschi v. B. &E. Sec., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 64 (D. Utah 1966).
95. Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
citing Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964).
96. Hirschi v. B. & E. Sec., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 64 (D. Utah 1966).
97. 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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approach seems sound in light of the dependence of securities fraud suits
upon the class action device.
In determining whether common questions predominate, the factor of
reliance poses the greatest difficulty 9s since the degree of reliance will usually
vary with each member of the class. In Berger v. PurolatorProducts, Inc.,99
the court denied class treatment even though the case involved a single
misrepresentation common to the entire class because "each claim would
turn on whether the particular member of the class actually relied . . . and
...100 This unfortunate interpretawhether such reliance was reasonable.
tion would defeat all securities fraud class suits and undermine the basic
purpose of the rule. However, other courts have taken a more permissive
position.101 In Fisher v. Kletz, 1°2 for example, the court reasoned that since
the statements formed a common course of conduct directed at the entire
class, the class members' reliance would not vary materially. While this
reasoning seems oversimplified in equating the variations in reliance with
the degree of variance in the misrepresentational statements, it is clearly
more acceptable than the strict approach of Berger.
The court's ruling on the reliance issue may be influenced by the
definition of the class. In Jacobs v. Paul Hardiman, Inc. 10 3 the named
plaintiffs purchased stock during the original offering; however, the named
class extended to all holders of the stock. In rejecting the suit, the court
reasoned that the factual and legal situations of those who purchased in the
open market were significantly different from any of the named plaintiffs.
Statutes of limitations applicable to individual class members may also
104
affect the permissibility of a class suit. In Hirschi v. B. & E. Securities, Inc.,
the court refused class treatment because of the cumulative effect of difficulties
involving individual matters of reliance and the statute of limitations. Although the applicability of different statutes of limitations probably should
not, by itself, defeat class treatment, a class action may be unmanageable
when, as in Hirschi this difficulty is combined with other individual questions.
Where individual questions threaten to defeat a class suit, clause (B) of
subsection (c) (4) allows the court to divide the class into subclasses and
treat each as a separate class. 105 While some courts have effectively utilized

98. The Advisory Committee's Note to the New Rule provides: "[A] fraud case may
be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation . . . in the kinds
or degrees of reliance .... ." 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).
99. 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
100. Id. at 545. Purolator Products, Inc. was engaged in merger negotiations with
Tung-Sol, Inc. Purolator held some stock in Tung-Sol and when the merger negotiations
broke off, the president of Purolator made an alleged misrepresentation to a news reporter
concerning the Tung-Sol stock held by Purolator.
101. E.g., Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kronenberg v. Hotel
Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
102. 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
103. 42 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
104. 41 F.R.D. 64 (D. Utah 1966).
105. Clause (B) of subsection (c) (4) provides that "a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
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this procedure in securities fraud cases, 106 others have apparently overlooked
the possibilities of this section and have dismissed class suits where clause
(c) (4) (B) was clearly applicable. 10 7 Greater use of this device would aid
in the management of class suits and provide a method of recovery to small
claimants.
The revised rule should prove more effective than the old rule as a
vehicle for securities fraud suits. However, its full potential has not been
realized because some courts have interpreted the rule too strictly. Other
courts have applied reasoning appropriate under the old rule but no longer
valid. Since the drafters provided for flexibility, the present requirements of
the rule can be relaxed through judicial discretion when the advantages of
the class action device are clearly evident. The exercise of such discretion
would enable the rule to serve its proper purpose.
Antitrust Actions
During the first fifty years of the Sherman Act's existence, private plaintiffs were successful in only thirteen of the 175 actions brought.'08 Although
this area has recently been subject to rapid change, it is yet too early to
predict the extent to which the new rule will be utilized in antitrust cases.' 09
The Advisory Committee recognized the possible use of the class action in
the antitrust area and has indicated that difficulties with the former rule
in this area gave impetus to the formulation of the new rule." 0 The availability of treble damages in certain antitrust litigation and the exemption
from the 10,000 dollar jurisdictional requirement' considerably increase the
potential impact of class actions in this area.
Like securities fraud cases, antitrust suits are permitted under section
(b) (3) of the new rule where common questions predominate over individual questions. The suit must meet the previously discussed prerequisites
of section (a) :12 before it can even be considered for class treatment.
and applied accordingly." Fa. K Civ. P. 23 (c) (4) (B).
106. E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Kronenberg
v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
107. See Jacobs v. Paul Hardeman, 42 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) in which the court
dismissed the class suit. In that case the class was dearly separable into subclasses: those
buying during the original issue and those buying later on the open market.
108. ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Com . ArNrusr R'EP. 378 (1955).
109. ABA ANTmusT SECTION, ANrrrmus-r DEVELOPMENTS, 1955-1968 (1968).
110. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, For the United States District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
111. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964) provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained .... "
112. See text accompanying notes 22-40 supra. For cases discussing these prerequisites
in the antitrust area, see Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Cooperative Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d
Cir. 1968); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); City
of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramic Corp., 1968 Trade Cas. 72, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 1968 Trade Cas. 72, 469 (D. Minn. 1968).
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Generally, the common question in such suits is the alleged coinspiracy on
the part of the defendants. 113 In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co.,"- the court held that the common questions included
not only what the defendant's price would have been, absent the conspiracy,
but also the underlying conspiracy itself. Recent cases indicate that once the
possibility of conspiracy is established, a strong showing by the defendant
that individual questions predominate over this common issue will be required
to defeat the class suit. In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,1" 5 the defendant
alleged eight different individual matters in seeking dismissal of the class suit.
The court, however, refused to dismiss, holding that the common questions
of conspiracy predominated.
After establishing that common questions in an antitrust suit predominate,
most courts have readily admitted that the class action is best suited to the
litigation."16 The most serious obstacles to the maintenance of a class suit
in this area are the special notice provisions required in a (b) (3) suit. 1"'
In Eisen v. Carlisle 8c Jacquelin,1s the court recognized this problem and,
without deciding whether service by publication would satisfy the "best
practicable" notice requirement, the court did state that "ritualistic notice
in small print on the back pages of a newspaper would in no event suffice."
However, the court recognized that notice by publication might be permissible
if class members are not readily identifiable." 9
Another problem inherent in class antitrust actions is that classes and
claims often overlap. In a series of treble damage class action suits filed
against the Charles Pfizer Pharmaceutical Company, 20 for example, several
states filed suit on behalf of the state and the cities and counties within
V hile these suits were pending, the state of West Virginia sued
the state.' 2 ' W
on behalf of "all cities, counties, municipal and public corporations throughout the United States." 1 2 ' Clearly, the suit by West Virginia included, as
part of its class, those named as plaintiffs in the other actions. Congress

113. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555
114. 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
115. 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967). Defendant
of misrepresentations, damages, coercion, required or
discrimination, merger and monopoly predominated
spiracy.

(2d Cir. 1968).
alleged that the individual questions
forced purchases, price fixing, price
over the common question of con-

116 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Iowa v. Union Asphalt
& Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
117. See text accompanying notes 51-75 supra.
118. 391 F.2d 555, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1968).
119. Apparently, even where notice by publication is the "best practicable," the notice
published must be more than a mere classified announcement. Id. at 569-70.
120. The company was convicted of violation of the antitrust laws. United States v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 281 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Based on this criminal conviction
various class suits were brought against the defendant.
121. Florida v. Charles Pfizer K- Co., BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 330, A-5
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Texas v. Charles Pfizer & Co., BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE RFC .REP. No. 317,
A-12 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
122. West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 342,
A-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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responded by enacting the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 123 which provides

that civil actions involving common questions of fact may be transferred to
one district for consolidated pretrial proceedings. With all claims transferred to one forum, a single court can determine all the considerations
pertinent to the maintenance of a class action. In the litigation against
Pfizer, twenty-three cases were transferred to the federal court in New York
City where sixteen suits against Pfizer had already been filed. This legislation
apparently remedies the inherent problem of overlap in the antitrust field.
Although the new rule has at times been viewed as being applicable only
in "the rarest of anti-trust cases,"'1 24 it is apparently a potent weapon for
those seeking recovery from violators of the antitrust laws.
Consumer Actions
1 25
Prior to Snyder v. Harris,
it was speculated that the new rule would be

most frequently used by consumers against various retailers and manufacturers. The new rule had placed the entire matter of federal court diversity
jurisdiction and the jurisdictional amount in controversy on which it relies
in doubt.126 Snyder, however, eliminated the vast majority of consumer suits
from federal court jurisdiction.127 The Class Action Jurisdiction Act 1 28
recently introduced in Congress, which is designed in part to counteract
Snyder, would give federal district courts jurisdiction over all consumer
class actions involving interstate commerce. The obvious purpose of the
Act is to give consumers access to the federal courts, where class actions are
generally more liberally allowed than in state courts. By basing jurisdiction
only on the involvement of interstate commerce, however, the federal courts
may become overburdened with cases that would ordinarily be exclusively
state claims.'
123.

29

3 0
The desirability of the proposed act is thus doubtful.

28 U.S.C. §1407 (Supp. IV 1968).

124. See Note, The Use of Federal Rule 23 in Private Antitrust Enforcement, 20
SYRACUSE L. REv. 949 (1969).

125.

394 U.S. 332 (1969).

126. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HAfv. L. REv. 356, 400 (1967).

127. Some consumer suits are still capable of meeting federal jurisdictional requirements but the small claimant, whom rule 23 was intended to benefit, is generally not able
to meet the amount in controversy requirement.
128. S.1980, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
129. Under the proposed act, neither diversity nor $10,000 amount in controversy (even
aggregate) is necessary for federal jurisdiction. Id.
130. For an analysis of consumer class actions on the state level, see Starrs, The Consumer Class Action -Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407 (1969).
ED ToR's NoTE: In 1970, competing proposals for consumer class actions were introduced
in Congress. The Tydings bill would permit injured parties to initiate consumer class
actions; the Administration proposal requires that the Justice Department or the Federal
Trade Commission first bring a successful injunctive action against the supplier. While the
latter proposal is restricted to eleven particular unfair practices, the Tydings bill covers
all practices that are "unfair or deceptive" within the meaning of §5 (a) (1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. For a discussion of the relative merits of the proposals, see TRIAL,
April-May 1970, at 14-27.
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Environmental Actions
Class actions may have a future impact on "environmental suits" involving, for example, the pollution or destruction of natural resources. Although
there are no appellate decisions in this area, several cases are now pending. 3
In view of the recent public and congressional concern with the problems
of pollution, frequent attempts to utilize the class action device in suits of
this nature are likely.
ADVANTAGES OF CLASS AcTIONS

The advantages of the class action can be grouped into three categories:
economic, psychological, and procedural. 1" 2 The economic advantages are
apparent. Some individual suits may be so small that they cannot practically
be litigated; however, if misled investors, overcharged consumers, or others
whose claims are individually small combine in one suit, these claimants are
afforded a vehicle for meaningful redress.' 83 The economic advantages are
not restricted to the plaintiff, however. The class action device diminishes
attorneys' paperwork and keeps court costs within the manageable limits of
a single action.13 Courts have consistently held that unnamed members of
the class who benefit from the judgment must assist in paying the costs of
13
the proceedings, including attorneys' fees. 5
The psychological advantages are diverse. It is advantageous, for example,
to come before the court, not alone, but as a representative of many. Class
actions tend to communicate the idea of a "public wrong" rather than a mere
isolated and individual complaint. In some situations, the notoriety is such
that news coverage creates a public awareness of the wrongs. This helps to
reduce the advantages that corporate defendants may enjoy by virtue of large
financial resources, and it may also aid in informing absent members of the
class of the pendency of the suit, prompting them to step forward to assert
their rights. In short, the class action compensates for the lack of cohesiveness,
inaccessibility, and the unwillingness to participate that makes joint action
6
by small claimants ineffectual."
Basically, three procedural advantages are offered by a class action. First,
the commencement of the class action suspends the statute of limitations for

131. A class suit has been commenced in New York to enjoin the polluting of the
Hudson River. Id.
132. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L.
REv. 433, 435 (1960).
133. Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois,
42 ILL. L. REv. 518 (1947).
134. Starrs, Consumer Class Actions, in NATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR EDUCATION IN LAW
AND POVERTY BOOK ON CONSUMER LAW 344 (1968).
135. King v. City of Covington, 289 Ky. 695, 160 S.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1942); Behrman v.
Egan, 75 A.2d 627 (N.J. 1950).
136. Comment, The Class Action Device in Anti-Segregation Cases, 20 U. CHI. L. REv.
577, 581 (1953).
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unnamed as well as named parties.137 Thus, any unnamed party may join
the class at a later time unless his individual claim was barred by the statute
prior to the commencement of the class suit. Second, the class action offers
protection from dismissal on grounds of mootness. 138 A defendant cannot
gain dismissal by granting the relief sought by the representative when it can
be shown that other persons "similarly situated will not be afforded similar
treatment."' 139 This "continuing controversy" exception to the doctrine of
mootness, first utilized in desegregation cases, has been extended by some
courts to various other types of class actions.40 Other courts have maintained
that jurisdiction "depends upon the state of affairs existing at the time it is
invoked,"'' and later changes in the status of the parties will not affect it.
In any event, the class action offers built-in protection where a named representative no longer has a justiciable claim. The rule provides a unique opportunity to reshuffle the parties by substituting an unnamed class member
(by intervention) .- 2 The third procedural advantage is that a class action
widens the scope of admissible evidence. 4 3 Since the reach of a class action
is broader, it encompasses a wider limit of proof. This improves the plaintiff's chances of recovery by making it more difficult to defend against the
suit.

44

The advantages of a class suit are not limited to the parties involved.
The device also allows courts to handle many legal disputes at once, thus
diminishing court congestion and allowing judges more time for other
actions.145 The potential of class actions to save judicial time indirectly
benefits the general public.
CONCLUSION

The drafters of revised rule 23 have provided a workable device for the
procedural treatment of class actions. Commenting in 1948 on the usefulness
of the former rule, the court in Montgomeiy Ward & Co. v. Langer said:- 6

137. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See also Weinstein, supra note
132, at 435.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or com-

promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
139. Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U.S. 517, 518 (1952).
140. See Singleton v. Board of Comm'rs of State Institutions, 356 F.2d 771 (5th Cir.
1966); Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional Hosp., 238 F. Supp. 512

(E.D.S.C. 1965); Makinson v. Board of Directors of School Dist. No. 4, 209 Ore. 232, 304
P.2d 1076 (1956).
141. Foster v. Nordman, 137 S.E.2d 600, 602 (S.C. 1964).

142. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (d) (2).
143.

Comment, supra note 136, at 581.

144.

See Starrs, supra note 134, at 345.

145. This agrees with current procedural trends to make "one lawsuit grow where
two grew before." Z. CiAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF Equrry 149 (1950).
146. 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
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